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File! OLA **ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET** SUBJECT: (Optional) Providing Source Information to Oversight Committees Charles A. Briggs STAT DATE Director, Office of Legislative Liaison 1.4 FED 1985 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED 20 **EXDIR** I WONDER IF THIS SHOULD NOT Be Jail FACE-TO-FACE RT THE DCI & DDCI DDCI~ 22 FEB 335 RATHER THAN Q7 4. Lerrer? Lerrens Ane cols 1 MAY 188 DCI 72-tels STAT 0 2 MAY 1985 7. D/OLL 8. STAT 1: Assume your
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## CONFIDENTIAL Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

The Honorable Joseph Addabbo, Chairman Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As we enter the 99th session of the Congress, I am obliged to write to you about one matter which is of great importance to me and to your Committee; namely, how best to furnish your Committee with the information it requires to carry out its responsibilities, while at the same time allowing me to carry out mine with respect to the protection of sources and methods. My major concern is the protection of secret sources who enter into a relationship with this Agency which places them in great personal danger with no protection other than our assurance that we will keep the relationship secret.

There are many variations of these relationships. Some involve payment for services. Some involve providing financial support to an individual or a group who are acting in their own political interest which happens to coincide with the interests of the U.S. Government. Some receive no payment or support of any kind but nevertheless run deep risks because of what they do for us or merely because of their association with us. In all these cases the association is secret and the risk due to exposure is severe. Great harm can also be caused by exposure of sensitive liaison relations and these too must be given the same protection as individual sources.

Historically, the Intelligence Oversight Committees have recognized the necessity for maximum protection of sensitive source relationships by restricting requests for such information to those narrow situations wherein there was substantive evidence of illegality, and the identification of a relationship was a necessary element to prove or disprove the charge. In recent times there has been some tendency for staffs to request sensitive relationship information on a much wider and more speculative basis.

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I believe it is in our joint interest to reaffirm our commitment to the protection of these relationships. Consequently, I am directing all personnel of this Agency to stop the communication of such information except in those unusual circumstances to be agreed to by you and me. Whenever your Committee requests information concerning a sensitive relationship, either I or John McMahon will personally review the request and will contact you to discuss and resolve the issue. In this way I believe we can securely provide the information the Committee needs to do its work while avoiding unnecessary risks to sensitive sources.

I would be pleased to discuss this matter further with you if you so desire.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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